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The Mystique of Secrecy
The Government's Attempt at Prior Restraint
By Ervin KuDU
In the Spring of 1979, the Federal Nuclear
Regulatory Commission released to the press the
transcripts of its frantic deliberations during the
nuclear accident at Three Mile Island-a fascinating
record of confusion, ineptitude, and downright
deception. By far the most revealing line in those
transcripts was a comment made by the Chairman of the
Commission, Joseph X. Hendrie, who asked his fellow
commissioners, 'hich amendment is it that guarantees
freedom of the press? Well, I'm against it."
By now, I hope, someone has told Commissioner
Hendrie which amendment it is that guarantees freedom
of the press. But I'm afraid he is by no means the
oly official of our Federal Government to share a
devotion to secrecy and, if necessary, deception. My
own experience with the Government's passion for
secrecy began long before the notorious -H-Bomb case
in which The Progressive was involved last year.
About ten years ago, when I was working as a
reporter in Washington, I wrote a few news stories
about an exotic U.S. Navy scheme that was then called
-

'Project Sanguine"L-a plan to bury a huge underground
radio grid in northern Wisconsin for the transmission
of extremely-low-frequency signals to submarines at
sea. Project Sanguine was controversial then and is
still controversial now, though it has gone through"a
few cosmetic name changes; it was transformed first
into Project Seafarer and, more recently and cutely,
into Project ELF.
One day I received a call from a member of
Senator Gaylord Nelson's staff. 'ome
on over," he
said. "e've got something interesting to show you."
I went over and he showed me: Nelson had requested a
look at the Navy's file on Project Sanguine, and in
that file were clippings of my published news
stories. Each had officially been stamped '"ECRE="
I thought at the time that this was the most
bizarre example of the Government's obsession with
secrecy I would ever encounter. I was mistaken.

From March 9, 1979, when Federal District Judge
Robert W. Warren of Milwaukee issued, at the
0overnment's request, a temporary restraining order

(which became a preliminary injunction on March 26),
until September 28, 1979, when that injunction was
lifted by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Chicago, the editors of The Progressive and a freelance writer named Howard Morland were the first and
only journalists in American history to be subjected
to a prior restraint injunction on "national
security" grounds.
The article we were enjoined from 'publishing
or otherwise communicating or disclosing in any
manner" was one Morland compiled from published
materials available in almost any library; from a
tour of nuclear weapons facilities arranged for him
by the U.S. Department of Energy; and from interviews
page tw'o

he conducted as a reporter receiving on-the-record
information. It was, in other words, an article that
could be replicated by any other enterprising
reporter-or by anyone else willing to do some
competent research.
Yet the Government insisted that Morland's
article contained "secrets" which would, if
published, injure the United States. And Judge
Warren, undoubtedly impressed by sworn affidavits
submitted by such luminaries as the Secretaries of
State, Defense, and Energy, abrogated a twocenturies-old tradition against prior restraint.
The statute under which we were muzzled is tfie
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which declares:
"The term 'Restricted Data' means all data
concerning (1) design, manufacture, or
utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production
of special nuclear materials; or (3) the use of
special nuclear material in the production of
energy, but shall not include data declassified
from the Restricted Data category.."
or removed
Two things
are worth noting about that
provision: First, it applies to nuclear Ene= &s
well as nuclear weaponry. and could presumably be
invoked to keep us from knowing details of the next
catastrophic nuclear accident that is sure to happen
sooner or later.
Second, the Government has
construed that language of the act to encompass all
data, whether or not they originate with the
Government.
It is important to understand that in compiling
his article for The Proressive Howard Morland never
saw a classified document-and I have seen none since
I examined those clippings of my own news stories in
the Navy's folder on Project Sanguine. But the
Government contends that under the Atomic Energy Act,
all nuclear information that has not been
specifically declassified is "data restricted at
birth"that is, classified as soon as it comes into
being, even if it originates in a citizen's own mind.
What we have, in other words, is an Official
Secrets Act-and an incredibly broad and sweeping
one--that has gone unchallenged for a quarter of a
century. Whether that fact alone suggests a certain
lack of diligence on the part of the press and other
guardians of the First Amendment is a question that
should be pondered by all of us.
As long ago as 1958, the House Committee on
Astronautics and Space Ekploration cited the Atomic
Energy Act as an example of "official vigilance .
carried to dangerous extremes," and added: ' iowever
well intentioned, however loosely or intelligently
enforced, such a law is a latent danger to the life
of this democracy." In The Progressive's case, that
"latent danger" was transformed into an open and
overt attack on our First Amendment rights. And when
I say our First Amendment rights, I donft mean ours
at The Proressive or ours in the press. I mean the
First Amendment rights of every American.
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Mystique of Secrecy...
Before it went to court last year to muzzle The
Progressive, the Government of the United States had
mounted only one previous effort to impose a prior
restraint on publication on grounds of so-called
national security. That was the 1971 Pentagon Papers

case, directed at two of America's great newspapers,
The New York Times and The Washington Post, and it
was swiftly and decisively rebuffed by the courts.

In that case, the Government told the courts
that if the Pentagon Papers were published,
catastrophic consequences woul4 ensue: thousands of
American soldiers in Vietnam would lose their lives;
prisoners of war would be executed; CIA agents around
the world would be murdered; US. alliances would be
disrupted. It is always easy to find-or inventrationalizations for secrecy.
The judge in The Washington Post case asked the
Government to submit in camera a list of the ten most
damaging disclosures in the Pentagon Papers-the ten
facts which, if published, would do the greatest
harm. The Government complied and submitted such a
list. It has only become available in the last three
or, four years under a Freedom of Information request.
It, turned out that every one of those ten calamitous
disclosures had previously been published.
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An incident back in 1950, involving Scientific
American magazine, is even more relevant to our
recent experience at The Progressive. Scientific
American was on the press with an article about the
hydrogen bomb by nuclear scientist Hans Bethe when
the Atomic Energy Commission stepped in, stopped the
presses, destroyed several thousand magazines that
had already been printed, demolished the plates, and
refused to let the magazine go back to press unless
it deleted four passages from Bethe's article.
Gerard Piel, who was the publisher of Scientific
American then and is still the publisher today, has
written and talked about this episode. He makes the
point that three of the four passages that the
Government ordered deleted from Bethe's article had
previously been published in Scientific American.
But the fourth was even more interesting: It was a'
piece of deliberate misinformation-or, as the CIA'
likes to say, disinformation-which Bethe had
deliberately inserted into the article in order to
throw the Russians off the track. Because it' is
common in the bureaucracy for the left hand not to
know what the right hand is doing, that passage, too,
was ordered deleted from the article.
It seems absurd, of course--just as it seems
absurd that the Government went to court to suppress
Howard Morland's article for The Progressive though
it was later forced to admit that the technical,
information it had tried to suppress in that article
had been declassified years ago and made available on
public library shelves. But there is a method to the
Government's madness.
In 1950, when Scientific American's presses
were stopped, President Truman had secretly made the
decision to go ahead with development of the hydrogen
bomb. That decision was a very controversial one;
the Government's own scientists were deeply divided
on the issue. So when Truman decided to proceed, he
issued an order to the Atomic Energy Commission
directing it to suppress, wherever possible, public
discussion, debate, and controversy over the H-bomb.
In its zeal to comply with that executive order, the
AEC stopped the presses at Scientific American.

Exactly the same rationale applied to the
Government's assault on the First Amendment in The
Progressive's case. For a third of a century 'now,
our Government's nuclear policies have been shrouded
in secrecy and screened from public knowledge,
discussion, and debate.
We were finally able to publish Howard
Morland's article in the November 1979 issue of The
Progressive. Every reader can now see that it is not
a 'blueprint" for construction of a hydrogen bomb.
It is not an article that could be used by anyone
intending to build a hydrogen bomb. That kind of an
article, as the publisher of Scientific American has'
pointed out, would entail publishing carloads of
blueprints and computer printouts. The hydrogen bomb
is not a device that can be built in your basement.
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It is not something that can be built by terrorists
or by organized crime or by some lunatic despot in a
struggling, underdeveloped nation. It is a device

that requires a huge, sophisticated, and enormously
expensive industrial complex, and that can therefore
be built only by a very large government. That is
why only five very large governments have built itthe United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain,
and France.
Some have commented with reference to The
Proressive's First Amendment case that they would
not want "an irresponsible government" to be able to
build a hydrogen bomb. Obviously, neither would we.
But the sad fact is that five irresponsible
governments have already built hydrogen bombs-and
the irresponsible government of the United States has
stockpiled some 30,000 of them, enough to destroy the
wbrld many times over. No one but an irresponsible
government would build such a monstrous machine.

Howard Morland's article is about nuclear
secrecy. We asked him, in the summer of 1978, to
tqke a hard look at the secrecy in which the U.S.
nuclear program has been shrouded for more than
thirty years. We suspected-and his article more
lthan confirmed our suspicionr-that the mystique of
secrecy was being invoked to deny Americans
iiiformation to which they were entitled-information
they needed to have if they were to exercise their
responsibilities as citizens making informed
decisions on public issues which are literally
matters of life and death.
a,
Here are a couple of examples of the uses and
aIuses of nuclear secrecy: In Honolulu, the United
Sates Navy has recently completed the construction
pagefour

of underground storage bunkers--"igloos," they are
called-in which it plans to store up to 1,200
nuclear warheads. The facility is located a mile and
a half from the main runway at Honolulu International
Airport. There are some citizens in Honolulu who are
a bit upset about that, and who decided that the Navy
ought to be required to file an environmental impact
statement discussing the possible consequences of an
airliner crashing into those igloos. The Government
sent a classification expert to Honolulu to testify
that no environmental impact statement could be
filed, and no information could be provided, because
to do so would entail a breach of national security.
A Federal Judge in Honolulu upheld that assertion,
and when he was recently reversed by the Court of
Appeals, it ruled that only individuals cleared for
access to "secret" information would be able to see
the Navy's environmental impact statement.
Another example: In the fall of 1978, at
Howard Morland's request, Representative Ronald V.
Dellums of California wrote a letter to the
Department of Energy in which he asked a series of
questions focusing on a significant increase in the
Government's procurement of plutonium. Dellums asked
whether more bombs were being produced, or whether
bombs were being produced that required more
plutonium, or whether perhaps the neutron bomb
required production of additional plutonium. He
received a reply from the Secretary of Energy
advising him that his questions were classified-not
the answers, but the questions. It seemed to us that
if the time had come in America when a citizen-indeed, a member of Congress--could not even ask
questions without having them classified, we were in
a great deal of trouble.
Morland discovered very quickly that the socalled secrets on which such absurd abuses of the
democratic process were based were not secrets at
all-that they were available to thousands of
scientists, here 4nd abroad; that they could be
readily ascertained by any competent researcher; but
that they served as a handy-dandy all-purposerationale for withholding vital information from
Americans.
It is a situation reminiscent of the U.S.
bombing of Cambodia in the late 1960s. That was a
"secret," too. It wasn't a secret, of course, from
the people being bombed, or from the Vietnamese, or
from the Russians, or from the Chinese. It was
merely a secret from the American people, and it kept
them from effectively challenging the ruinous course
being pursued by their government. That is exactly
the purpose served by the secrecy in which the
Government has enveloped its nuclear programs.

In 1643, the British Parliament enacted a law
conferring on a Committee of Examinations the power
"to regulate printing: that no book, pamphlet, or
paper shall be henceforth printed, unless the same be
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first approved and licensed by such, or at least one
of such, as shall be thereto appointed." It was
against that law that John Milton directed his famous
Areoaitica.
'henceforth," he wrote, "let no man
care to learn, or care to be more than worldly wise;
for certainly in higher matters to be ignorant and
slothful, to be a common steadfast dunce, will be the
only pleasant life and only in request."
What we learned last year is that the
Government of the United States is convinced it must
keep the people of this nation ignorant and slothful
so that they can lead the only pleasant life while
the world marches toward nuclear Armageddon.
But we also learned that the spirit of freedom
still flourishes in our country-even after three
decades of Cold War, witchhunts, and obsession with a
kind of 'ational security" that seems to grow more
elusive the more relentlessly it is pursued.
We learned, to be sure, that freedom has many
fair-weather friends. But we also learned that it
has devoted and unwavering defenders. Among them are
citizens who had never heard of The Progressive did
not share its political perspectives, did not care
about the nuclear issues involved in our struggle,
but were simply outraged by the very idea of
censorship.
We learned, to be sure, that a Federal judge
would violate 200 years of legal precedents against
prior restraint. But we also learned that we could
receive a fair and full hearing in the appellate

courts, and that we could muster a formidable array
of legal talent in our behalf and in behalf of the
First Amendment. We believe we would have won the
right to publish Howard Morland's article in the
courts if the Government had not aborted the case by
moving to vacate the injunction. We believe that is
why the Government moved to vacate the injunction.
We learned, to be sure, that the costs of
defending freedom can be astronomic, and could easily
destroy a publication like The Progressive. But we
also learned that among our readers and outside our
readership there are people willing to help defray
those costs. We have found some of those people, and
we hope, to find the others whose help we need as we
continue to pay legal costs that reached almost
$250,000.
We learned, most significantly, that our
country still provides the promise of freedm-and
that the promise grows stronger when it is put to the
test.

For more information, see the May 1979 and
November 1979 issues of The Progressive. Howard
Moreland's article is in the latter. The judicial
opinions are reported at 467 F. Supp. 990 (injunction
issued), 610 F. 2d 819 (injunction dismissed) and 486
F. Supp. 5 (defendants' motion for reconsideration
denied).
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